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The European Parliament may yet reject February’s EU budget
deal.
by Blog Admin
In February, after months of negotiations, the European Council agreed to a new multiannual
budget for the EU for 2014 to 2020. Ahead of the European Parliament’s vote on the budget,
Giacomo Benedetto takes an in-depth look at how spending has changed across policy
areas, finding that the largest cuts have been made to policies aimed at enhancing growth,
infrastructure and the knowledge economy. With fewer cuts due to be applied to controversial
policy areas like cohesion and agricultural policy, the European Parliament may yet vote to
reject the current budget proposal.
On 8 February the European Council reached a unanimous agreement on the EU’s next multiannual f inancial
f ramework (MFF) f or the years 2014-2020. The agreement will now go to the European Parliament f or
approval. According to article 312 of  the Lisbon Treaty, the MFF only comes into f orce f ollowing a decision
by the governments af ter the Parliament has granted its consent. It seems that many MEPs take the view
that this gives them a right of  proposal. Recent reports have suggested that, f ollowing the rule book of  the
Parliament, one-f if th of  its members may invoke the right f or the Parliament to take this vote in a secret
ballot. The possibility of  parliamentary obstruction cannot be discounted and has precedents. In 2006, the
Parliament blocked the agreement on the current f ramework (2007-2013) to secure small increases. But
what exactly is the European Parliament voting on?
What did the 27 governments agree on 8 February?
The European Council has agreed to a spending ceiling of  €960 billion between 2014 and 2020 in 2011
prices, or 1 per cent of  gross national income (GNI), in commitments. In payments this equates to €908
billion or 0.95 per cent of  GNI. The dif f erence between commitments and payments is one of  the problems
that exist in understanding the budget. These two f igures are maximums which annual spending cannot
exceed, so in practice the annual budgets will be lower than 0.95 per cent of  GNI. Although €908 billion in
payments sounds like a lot of  money, it is less than 1 per cent of  the size of  the EU’s economy and around
2 per cent of  total public spending. For each of  the seven years, the f igure f or annual spending reaches a
maximum of  around €130 billion (in 2011 prices). For the 2014-2020 MFF the European Commission made
proposals in 2011, as it did in 2004 f or the 2007-2013 MFF. In what f ollows, I have applied 2011 prices
across the board f or the sake of  simplicity and comparability.
So how is the average f igure of  130 billion per year divided up? Figure 1 below gives a summary of  the
changes in the percentage share of  spending f or dif f erent policy areas, rather than decreases or increases
in actual amounts due to the f act that the agreement also changed the overall amounts. If  ratif ied by the
European Parliament, the agreement f oresees a share of  28.9 per cent of  spending going to direct
payments in agriculture and f isheries (under heading 2). This a cut of  5 per cent compared to 2007-13, but
an increase of  1.4 per cent compared to what the Commission had proposed in 2011. A share of  33.9 per
cent would go to cohesion and regional development (under heading 1b), a cut of  1.8 per cent compared to
the current perspective that expires this year, but an increase of  1.1 per cent compared to what the
Commission had proposed in 2011.
On non-redistribution that provides public goods (collective benef its f or the EU economy), 13.1 per cent
would be allocated to support economic growth and innovation (heading 1a), including inf rastructure and
research and development. This is an increased share of  spending of  4.5 per cent compared to the existing
budget, but is still 2 per cent below what the Commission proposed in 2011. Natural resources (under
heading 2) that include environment and rural development but exclude direct payments in agriculture and
f isheries should reach 9.9 per cent of  spending, a small increase of  0.8 per cent compared to the existing
perspective and a f reeze compared to the Commission proposal of  2011. The changes in percentage share
f or security and cit izenship (heading 3); global Europe (heading 4) and administration (heading 5) all remain
below 1 per cent. In f ollowing policy priorit ies that are set by the governments of  the member states, and by
the European Parliament, the Commission proposed an MFF in 2011 that increased spending f or public
goods (under heading 1a and the f irst part of  heading 2), slightly reduced redistribution under heading 1b
and very signif icantly reduced spending in agriculture and f isheries. The agreement of  8 February partly
reversed these changes.
Figure 1 – Percentage share of EU budget – agreements vs. proposals 
Comparability, inflation, economic growth, commitments and payments
The European Union calculates its budget and any increases or decreases in terms of  economic growth
rather than inf lation. This is perf ectly valid, but dif f ers f rom national approaches. If  economic growth
exceeds inf lation, budgetary increases in the EU may seem exorbitant. When economic growth is lower,
spending increases are below inf lation. During the good economic years until 2008, the increase in the EU
budget was considerably less than the expansion of  national budgets. During a recession or t imes of  low
inf lation, EU spending can appear to be unreasonably high but this is because it has been f ixed since 2007
at 1 per cent of  GNI f or payments. In 2011, the Commission proposed the new MFF f or 2014-2020 also at 1
per cent of  GNI. In this sense it was a f reeze but did not seem so since inf lation was lower than economic
growth.
As Figure Two illustrates, payments f or the 2007-2013 budget round were set at €821 billion in 2004 prices
(or 1 per cent of  GNI). In 2011, the Commission proposed the new MFF also at 1 per cent of  GNI, which in
2011 prices was 18 per cent higher at € 972 billion. Commitments were 5 per cent higher than payments.
Because the European Union pref ers to manage spending through multiannual programmes, the principles
of  commitments and payments allow f or double budgeting. Commitments are the upper level at which
contracts can be made and programmes can be started. Payments, which are usually lower, are the
maximum amount in any year that can be paid out on completion of  a project. Commitments made during
one year have to be honoured with payments two years later if  all the conditions are f ulf illed. Conf usion
over the signif icance of  commitments and payments can create deadlock at budgetary negotiations. In
order to cut spending, governments try to limit payments which are supposed to honour the payment f or
projects that the same governments approved two years earlier. The European Parliament and the
Commission usually def end commitments more than payments since they allow more generous f inancial
planning and subsequent payments are considered a legal obligation.
Figure 2 – EU Budget Commitments and Payments 2007-2013
Amounts for Spending
So, while the overall budget has decreased, how have the spending amounts changed across policy areas? 
Taking 2011 prices and payments of  1 per cent of  GNI as a benchmark, we have totals f or payments at €
972 billion and commitments at €1023 billion f or the 2007-13 f inancial perspective. How do these compare
with the proposed changes?
In 2007-13, growth and innovation (heading 1a) were set at €88 billion (or 8.6 per cent of  total spending). In
2011 the Commission proposed to increase this by 76.5 per cent to €155 billion or 15.1 per cent of  the total
share. This ref lected the principles of  the governments in creating a knowledge economy around
technology, inf rastructure, and research and development, consistent with the Lisbon and Europe 2020
strategies. The agreement of  February 2013 reduced this proposed level by 18.9 per cent to €126 billion or
13.1 per cent of  the total share. Although still an increase compared to the 2007-2013 MFF, this reduction
party f inanced the overall cut in EU spending demanded by the net contributors, who ironically benef it f rom
expenditure on the knowledge economy. Across all the policy areas, this 18.9 per cent cut was the steepest.
Figure 3 – Budget allocations by EU policy area 2007-2013
In 2007-13, cohesion (heading 1b) commitments were €365 million or 35.6 per cent of  the total. It was
expected that af ter 2013, cohesion payments to the older member states would be reduced to the benef it
of  states that have joined since 2004. In 2011 the Commission nevertheless proposed a small reduction
down to €336 billion. The February agreement f urther reduced this to €325 billion or 33.9 per cent of  a
lower total share.
The f irst part of  heading 2 (natural resources excluding direct payments to the CAP and CFP) is an area of
public goods that includes environment and rural development. This retained a roughly equal share of  the
total budget under all proposals of  between 9 and 10 per cent, but with a more generous f inancial proposal
f rom the Commission. The overall cut in spending agreed in February 2013 also applied to this area.
The second part of  heading 2 is direct payments f or agriculture and f isheries, historically the most
controversial budget area. In 2007 these had been reduced f rom approximately 41 to 33.9 per cent of
spending. In f igures, this meant €347 billion in 2007-13, with the Commission proposing a reduction to €282
billion in 2011, and the governments f urther reducing it to €278 billion. Compared to the Commission
proposal of  2011, this was the smallest percentage cut to any policy area introduced by the governments.
This ref lected mobilisation by France and some of  the member states that joined in 2004, which were due
to access agricultural f unds on an equal basis with the old states f rom the beginning of  2014. The net
contributors wanted to reduce the EU budget compared to the Commission’s proposal, but did not do so at
the expense of  agriculture or cohesion. Instead public goods f or innovation in growth, education and
inf rastructure were targeted.
The next three headings (3 – Security and Citizenship; 4 – Global Europe; 5 – Administration) remain small
and have varied litt le during the stages of  the ref orm debate. Security and Citizenship set at 1.2 per cent of
total spending at present was proposed f or an increase of  nearly half  to 1.8 per cent until the February
agreement partly reversed this. The shares f or the other two headings have varied around 6 per cent of
total spending. In the light of  the ratif ication of  the Lisbon Treaty and the new responsibilit ies of  Catherine
Ashton and her successors, the Commission proposed an increase in the small budget f or Global Europe
f rom 5.7 to 6.8 per cent of  the total, only to be sent back down to 6.1 per cent on 8 February.
The budget and the European Parliament
In June 2011, the European Commission made a proposal to f reeze EU spending at 1 per cent of  GNI, to
increase spending in real terms on economic growth and innovation by 76.5 per cent, while to cut back on
cohesion and agriculture. If  ratif ied by the European Parliament, the MFF proposed by the Council in
February 2013 will reverse the substance of  the Commission’s proposal. The agreement of  February 2013
reduces total budget payments f or 2014-20 f rom €972 billion to €908 billion (or 6.6 per cent) so that
spending goes well below 1 per cent of  GNI. This is a cut f inanced most signif icantly through a reduction in
investment in economic growth to guarantee an overall cut that largely protects redistribution in agriculture
and cohesion.
The 2006 agreement f or the current (2007-13) MFF shared a similar outcome. It cut commitments f rom 1.08
to 1.048 per cent of  GNI compared to 2000-6, it cut payments f rom 1.07 to 1.00 per cent and, compared to
what the Commission had proposed in 2004, the cuts were f inanced through reductions in the proposed
spending f or public goods so as to salvage the posit ions of  agriculture and cohesion. In our edited volume
of  2012, Simona Milio and I predicted continuity in the MFF because the incentive f or a national veto is so
high. No new MFF would have meant continuity of  the old agreement with projects having to be agreed and
re-agreed annually as was the case bef ore 1988. A member state wishing to protect spending would have a
clear incentive to use this veto. So f ar, we have been proved wrong. However, the European Parliament
voting by secret ballot may achieve this outcome. In voting against the MFF, government party MEPs may
even be doing the bidding of  some national party leaders on the European Council, while MEPs f rom
opposition parties are less inclined to agree with the Council particularly if  encouraged by the leaderships
of  the three largest parliamentary groups (EPP, S&D and ALDE). The votes of  an absolute majority of  378
MEPs are required to approve the MFF, with absent or abstaining MEPs having the same ef f ect as voting
against. In January 2006, the Parliament voted ‘no’ and it could so again.
This article is a shortened version of the longer paper, Understanding the EU budget deal.
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